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This paper wac commissioned  by the Policy and Review Department Cof  the World Bank to
familiarize  Bank staff with concepts  underlying  discussion  of "governance"  as a development  issue. The
terms  of reference  requested  a review  of the politicai  science, development  management,  and institutional
economics  literature which bears directly upon the issues of governance -- specifically accountability
(including  institutional  pluralism and participation);  openness  (including  problems  resulting  in part from
lack of openness, e.g. corruption);  and predictability  or the rule of law.
Many people  have read various  versions  of this paper, or participated  in discussions  of its subject
matter, and offered extensive  comments  and suggestions. I would like to thank in particular, Coralie
Byrant and Sarwar Lateef, who made the preparation of this paper an exercise botn intellectually
stimulating  and enjoyable. Others who contributed  to refining  the ideas and their presentation  include
Miguel Schloss, Leslie Snyder, Kate McCollom, Lisa Pachter, Salvatore Schiavo-Campo,  Ladipo
Adamolekun,  Pierre Landell-Mills,  David Beckmann,  Valeriana  Kallab, Andres  Rigo, Geoffrey Lamb,
Samuel Paul,  Randall Harriss, Francisco Sagasti, and Dunstan Wai.1. INTRODUCTION
A.  Gsovernance  and Economy
Governments  determine how well, or how poorly, markets function.  This simple truth explains the
current concern with "governance"  as the world shifts toward an overwhelmning  endorsement  of markets
as the base of economic  activity. If governments  are assumed to be neutral, and committed  to serving
the public good, then deviations  from optimum  economic  performance  can generally  be corrected  simply
through policy reform, or through improving  information  systems. And yet, as Douglass  North argues,
economic  performance  is not easily explained  by the logic of economic  theory alone. Governments  are
not neutral.  Their rationality is more frequently  political  than economic. "The contrast," North says,
"between the logical implications  of neoclassical  theory and the performance  of economies  (however
defined and measured) is startling." (1990:11).
To  understand economic performance, it  is  important to  factor in  the  political role  of
governments. As Susan Strange notes, "Markets cannot play a dominant role in the way in which a
political economy  functions  unless allowed  to do so by whoever wields  power and possesses  authority."
(1988:23). The exercise of power and authority  lies at the heart of governance. Governments  use their
power and authority to establish and maintain the formal and informal framework  of institutions  that
regulate social and econc - interaction.  Governments  create the rule of law necessary to underpin
accountability,  transparenv,, and predictability  in interactions. Governments  --  in interaction  with their
citizens  -- determine many of the preconditions  for a thriving, or a declining,  domestic economy.
This paper attempts  to give the current concern  with governance  a historical  dimension, and to
locate  governance  as a technical  and intellectual  issue within  a body of literature  that has long addressed
these concerns.  It examines a limited number of governance  dimensions  -- accountability  (including
legitimacy,  institutional  pluralism and participation),  openness  and transparency, and predictability  (or
the rule of law) -- in a selective review of recent social science literature. The paper makes no claim
to be exhaustive, but rather to offer an introduction  to recent work which is built in part upon the
1analysis  of how politics and economics  interact in shaping economic  development. It explores  why and
how accountability,  openness  and predictability  matter, and how the different  ways in which  governments
use their power and authority create enabling  or disabling  economic  environments.
The issue of governance  rose to the forefront of development  agendas  at the close of the 1980s,
following  nearly a decade of concern with macroeconomic  policy reform.  In Africa, calls by citizens
and leaders for greater openness  and accountability  were joined by international  donors.  The World
Bank's 1989 Long-Term Perspective  Study (LTPS) -- Sub-Saharan  Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable
Growth--highlighted  a deep concern with governance as a development  issue:  "Underlying  the litany
of Africa's development  problems is a crisis of governance" (p. 60).  Addressing political issues as
openly  as it did, the LTPS created  a stir ifi the de-velopment  community. The LTPS linked governance
to issues of leadership  authority  and legitimary. It addressed  the absence  of balance  of power, the lack
of official  accountability,  the control  of information,  and a failure to respect  the rule of law. The LTPS
spoke in favor of "independence  for the judiciary, scrupulous  respect for the law and human rights at
every level of government,  transparent  accountability  of public monies, ancA  independent  public auditors
responsible to a representative legislature, not to an executive" (p.  192).
Although  the calls  for change  have  been loudest  in Africa, other  regions have  undergone  dramatic
shifts in governance. In Latin America, the rapid transitions  from authoritarian  to democratic  regimes
over the past decade offered a different reason for attention  to governance. Newly elected  legislatures
moved to transform old legal regimes, to reinforce new structures making government accountable  to
citizens, and to strengthen  their own capacity  to analyze, evaluate, and initiate policies.
Governance  issues surfaced in Asia over the past decade as well, most prominently  in China,
where a decade that opened  with a dramatic  transition  to economic  liberalization  closed  with the forceful
suppression of calls for political change --  in Tiananmen Square.  In the Soviet Union, glasnost
(openness)  in the Soviet Union focused new attention  on openness  as a critical element in governance.
In both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, political openness encouraged citizen's demands for
accountability,  and the move  toward a market economy  underscored  the need  to establish  legal guidelines
2and well-defined  property rights in order to secure private investment.  These events combined to
prompt related chunages  in the assistance offered by many bilateral and multilateral donors -- most
noticeably, the establishment  of the European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  xEBRD),
mandated  to reinforce changes in Eastern Europe through support for multi-party  governments  and for
other political dimensions  of development.
Although governments exercise their power and authority in different ways. they all affect
economic  activity. Many donors  have tried to draw a distinction  between  what Carol Lancaster  (1990)
has termed social or economic  governance, and political governance, although the line is difficult to
position  with any assurance.  This paper focuses  on those aspects  of governance  (in addition  to skill and
capacity)  that appear  to affect economic  performance: accountability,  openness  or transparency,  and the
rule of law.  These variables affect economic  performance  through their impact on fiscal integrity, on
predictability,  and on the creation  of an environment  conducive  to productive  investment.
In keeping with the limited focus on these three aspects of governar"e, this review does not
directly address the relationship between development performance and the form of government.
Although empirical research exists on hypothesized relationships between regime type (democracy,
dictatoiship, etc.) and growth and development,  the evidence  to date is mixed.  Indeed, one of the
puzzles that guides much of the inquiry  of political scientists, in particular, continues  to be "how it is
that many  nondemocratic  governments  seem to be as strongly  motivated  to guard the welfare of citizens
as democratic  governments"  (Lindblom 1977:x).
B.  Background  of the Concept of Governance
Governance  itself is a neutral concept, meaning  the "exercise  of authority; control," or, more broadly,
"government."  As a synonym for government, governance can be further defined as  "the political
direction  and control  exercised  over the actions  of the members,  citizens, or inhabitants  of communities,
3societies, and states."'  Recent empirical studies of governance  range from analyses  of Norway's wage
policy and Britain's management  of its health service (Rose 1980), to East Africa's rural development
prograrns (Hyden 1983).
Work in the area of governance is often interdisciplinary,  cutting across the boundaries of
economics,  political science, philosophy, sociology,  and management. Governance  has been analyzed
both normatively  (how should governments  behave?) and positively (how do governments  behave?).
This distinction  has ancient roots, as philosophers  have long debated the moral versus the utilitarian
foundations  of the nation-state  and its system of governance. 2 As long ago as 495 B.C., Confucius, an
experienced  bureaucrat  forced  into exile by Chinese  political  intrigue, argued  that a well-ordered  society
required government based on  superior morality rather than on  superior power.  Later Chinese
philosophers  countered  that "good" governance  above  all required  centralized,  absolute  authority. 3 Plato
(advisor  to the ruler Dionysius  II of Syracuse)  and his pupil  Aristotle  grappled  with questions  of political
reform, the rule of law, the nature of authority, and the principles  which ought to determine  the shape
of the ideal state, and its relation to production  and other economic  questions.
Modem  analyses  of  governance date  from  the  17th  century  Germanic  tradition of
politikwissenschaft (political  science)  and  the  18th  century  innovations  of  the  European  Age  of
'Random  House College  Dictionary,  rev. ed. New York:  Ranidom  House, 1984, p. 571.
2In Asia, theories of governance  can be traced to Confucious'  philosophy  of the moral institutions
underlying  social order, in particular, the "rectification  of names".  A well-ordered  society, he argued,
depended  on the fulfillment  of duties and responsibilities  inherent in social roles: ruler, minister, father,
and son, for example. If the ruler fulfilled  the "way  of the ruler," he would  have legitimacy;  for society
to prosper, all must fulfill their roles. Thus a son must be filial, a fathe;  aternal, and a ruler must offer
moral leadership  to the nation.  Social order depended  on everyone  fufilling his or her social role, on
the "rectification  of names." The heaviest  responsibility  fell on the leader: if he fulfilled  his duty, then
the chain of rectification  and social order would be in place; if not, social chaos would result.
'Mo Tzu's (c. 470-c.381 B.C.) influential  critique  of Confucius  used a utilitarian  argument: states
are established to  end disorder, and thus the eentralized authority of the ruler must be absolute.
"According  to the Mohists, the state exists because  it is useful.  But according  to the Confucianists,  it
exists because it ought to exist."  Mencius later elaborated the idea of two kinds of govermmental
authority: wang, or the sage-king, and pa, or the warrior-king. One bases its power in morality, the
other in force.  Contemporary  Chinese  thought  continues  this distinction. "a democratic  government  is
a rang  government,  because  it represents  a free association  of people, while  a Fascist govermment  is that
of a p  because it reigns through terror and physical  force. (Fung 1948: 73-75).
4Enlightenment. 4 Shifts from religious  to secular issues,  transitions  from feudalism,  a rising concern for
individual  rights, and the expansion  of the self-regulating  mark  't as an increasingly  important  medium
of exchange  raised questions  abcui.  the relationship  of political authority  to individual  and group welfare.
The foundation for many who grapple today with questions of the evolution of governance and of
society's relationship  with political  authority  was laid by writers such as John Locke, in his concern  with
structures tc prevent the abuse of authority; Jean-Jacques  Rousseau, and his idea of a social contract
between rulers and citizens; and Thomas Hobbes, who wrote about the propensity  of people to engage
in conflict  and to seek power, and ultimately,  to submit  themselves  to the coercive  rule of the absolutist
state, the Leviathan.
Max Weber's analysis of  modern, rational-legal  states, published in the  19t'1  century, still
underlies  many  Western ideas  of governance. Weber  pointed  to the "process  of rationalization",  arguing
that modern states differ from primitive states in their reliance on hierarchy, in the base of  the
leadership's  legitimacy,  and in their monopoly  of the use of legitimate  force.  Modern  states, he argued,
are based on norms of universalism rather than particularism.  They rely on detached and routine
decision-making  rather than on ad hoc procedures. Modern bureaucracies  are, in principle, structured
with management  hierarchies,  have clear rules for advancement,  and maintain  information  systems  that
assure continuity  and predictibility,  although as Anthony  Downs (1967) pointed out, many fail to live
up to this ideal.
Weber addressed the development of governance in  modern states from his perspective on
Western Europe.  Nearly a century later, Gunnar Myrdal in his Asian Drama:  An Inquiry into the
Poverty of Nations (1968) introduced the idea of "soft states" versus "hard states" in an influential
addition to the increasing body of "modernization"  literature, which focused on the problems of state-
building in developing countries.  The hard state sets priorities and carries them out.  Norms and
practices keep  bureaucrats  and politicians  separate. The soft state finds officials regularly  circumventing
laws and regulations.  Civil servants and politicians  secretly collude to thwart po!icy implementation,
40n the Germanic tradition, see Dunn 1986: 161, note 12.
Sand corruption riddles the system.  The hard state is a state in control of its regulations and policies.
Its civil ser-ice operates by Weberian  rational  bureaucratic  principles. Contrc', capability,  and volition
separate soft states from hard states.'
How does "good governance" develop?  Relations between rulers and ruled differ in avery
cvuntry.  History, custom, law, society, and political economy affect the way in which the ruled in a
country  hold rulers to account for their performance,  the relative openness  of a socio-political  system
or an economy, and the degree of predictability  in government  decision-making  and interaction  with the
public.  The development  of accountability,  openness, and the rule of law in Western Europe offers a
useful perspective  on the evolution  of governance.
C.  Historical Perspectives:  Evolution of Governance in Western Europe
The concept of  governmental accountability  in much of  Western Europe and the establishment  of
transparency  and an impersonal  rule cf law developed  slowly -- as . esult  of evolving  relations  between
rulers and elites. Although  these relations  were stimulated  by ideas  of personal  freedom and govermnent
responsibility  rooted in the 18th century Enlightenment,  they had much earlier roots.  In Britain, for
example, the Magna Charta, sealed in 1215, signaled  the first formal attempt by social elites to elicit
accountability  from their monarch.
Early European states resembled many of todav's  developing countries.  Caught between
cumbersome taxation systems and their need for revenues, monarchs borrowed heavily and operated
under chronic  deficits: financial crises brought Spain to bankruptcy  five times between 1575  and 1647
(Eggertsson 1990: 342).  The need to raise revenues to pursue state activities (wars, in particular)
'Later writers ammended  Myrdal's work by adding analyses of the history of governance  under
colonial  rule and of the influence  of colonial  institutions  on the development  of accountability  in post-
colonial states. Amartya  Sen (1991) suggests  that a "soft" state is in fact a state that responds  to public
demands:  "That need be no bad thing" (p. 425).
6brought monarchs into repeated struggles with the barons and dukes on whom they relied to extract
surpluses from the peasantry.
Historically,  accountability  in Europe  was wrestea from personal  ruie of royalty  by the pressure
of domestic elites:  "The admission  of the right of parliament to legislate, to enquire into abuses, and
to share in the guidanct  ,  nat:onal  policy was practically  purchased  by the money  gianted to Edward
I  and Edward H."'  Taxation evolved from a unilateral act by the crown to  a right that involved
reciprocity. The evolution  was slow.  Only in !782 was it possible in Britain for Parliament  to clearly
separate the crown's personal  account from general government  accounts (Theobald 1990).
Concerned  about  their lack of control  over revenues,  other European  elites demanded  institutions
like Britain's Parliament  which would evenmually  bring the monarch's budget out of the household  and
into national accounts.  In France, this led to the establishment  of the Estates General; In Spain, the
Cortes. French elites based their support  for the Revolution  of 1789  on the argument  that royal financial
discretion must be limited, that the public should be able to debate and influence  economic  policy, and
that public institutions  are needed to carry out these objectives. 7 The evolution of legal systems and
institutions  necessary  for market economies  -- protecting  private property rights against the law of the
commons, and enforcing  impersonal, contract-based  transactions  - paralleled  these developments.
Only later did the establ;shment  of popular  organizations  -- trade unions and other independent
associations  -- lead to pressure for more complete  representation  and political participation,  extending
accountability  from elites to the people at large. This evolution  toward greater openness  was no. rapid.
European institutions  based on the principle  that the bureaucracy  should serve the public rather than a
narrow group of elites only emerged in the 19th century.  British  public servants only began to receive
salaries in  1816 (Thwbald 1990: 27), and the principle of merit rather than "spoils" as the primary
'Stubbs 1896: 599 in North 1990- 114.
'Hilton L. Root and Daniel E. Ingberman "Tying the King's Hands:  Credible Commitments  and
Royal  Fiscal Policy  During the Old Regime." Working  paper. Philadelphia:  University  of Pennsylvania,
1987, p. 26, cited in Eggertsson, p. 348.
7'ehicle for recruitment  and promotion  in the European  public services  evolved  only in the past hundred
years (Hyden 1983: 58).  Both movements enhanced predictability and accountability in European
governments.
The brief sketcL above illustrates  broadly how institutions  supporting  predictabilit!, openness,
and accountability  developed in Western Europe.  In other parts of the world, these institutions  are
likely to have developed in alternative  ways.  The colonial  period, for example, affected institutional
aevelopment in a number of countries.  In many cases, Western European institutional forms were
transferred directly to developing  areas during periods of colonial  rule.  Brought in as part of a system
based on rule 'iy powerful external actors, the colonial civil service was never directly accountable  to
those whom they auled. Even when legislative  assemblies  were introduced as part of the "tutelage  in
parliamentary  democracy,"  they were filled in the first instance  with colonial  civil servants. In the post-
colonial  period, these public institutions,  superimposed  on political and economic  systems in which they
had no roots, continued to lack accountability. In many cases, government bureaucracies  failed to
continue as impartial, autonomous  institutions, but were captured by "clan pressures," politicized  as
"booty," (Hyden 1983: 60) -- and, in short, reverted  to the kinds of patrimonial  states common  in early
Europe.  "L'etat c'est moi" rings all too true in many post-colonial  nations today.
Furthermore, the European colonial practices and experiences were very  different if  one
compares, for example, the Spanish conquest of South America with British rule in India, or with
French rule in Africa.  The Spanish colonial  period took place much earlier, penetrated society more
deeply, and resulted in different institutional  patterns. The British in India imposed  an additional  layer
on a civilization  with a preexisting  system of national institutions  and a centralized  bureaucracy. The
French, along with other colonialists,  created a complex overlay of government  bureaucracies  and a
centralized  state apparatus  in Africa, imposing  central leadership  over many groups  that had developed
institutions  for communal  governance,  or even imperial  governance,  but not governance  at the national
level of a modern state.
8ThW  tragedy of mismanagement  and corruption in many modern nations can often be related to
this colonial  imposition  of states  and bureaucratic  institutions,  rather than their natural evolution  through
a process of citizen demands  for accountability  and ruler adjustments. 8 Peter Ekeh (1975) points to the
reputation  -or honesty among local ethnic associations  in Africa and contrasts this with corruption in
local governments.  Associations  based on a moral economy of reciprocity, responsibility and duty
contrast sharply with imposed  government  structures, a "profane amoral world based on instrumental
relationships  premised on the accumulation  of rights rather than duties" (Theobald 1990: 9).
Developing  accountability  in state-society  interactions  thus involves  more than simply adopting
standard  operating procedures  and other tools of rational-legal  bureaucracies. In the first place, many
of these institutions  are difficilt to transfer. Bureaucracies,  courts, the military, etc., must be rooted
in a local culture before they can reach a level of complexity  and efficiency which enables them to
support effective state action (Badie and Birnbaum 1983: 35).  But even more fundamentally, this
institutional  evolution  takes  time.  As Douglass North (1990) points out:  "The single most important
point about institutional  change, which must be grasped if we are to begin to get a handle  on the subject,
is that institutional  change is overwhelmingly  incremental"  (p. 89).
8Lonsdale  1986, Hyden 1983. With this in mind, donors should think  twice about  the implicit  hope
that  externally imposed re-form and  reorganization of  bureaucracies will somehow lead to  their
rationalization.
9II. GOVERNANCE  IN THE LITERATURE:
ACCOUNTABILITY,  OPENNESS,  AND THE RULE OF I AW
A.  Three Approaches: Political  Science, Institutional  Economics,  and Development  Management
A common theme linking these three bodies of literature is their concern about the framework for
decision-making  in the allocation  of scarce resources. Political  scientists  study the processes,  principles,
and structure of goverarr  it  and of political institutions:  bureaucracies, political parties, popular
participation, economic  regulations, procedures for controlling  conflict and for regulating succession
(Huntington 1968:1).  They analyze both concrete and theoretical issues of power, authority, and
legitimacy  in the context of the struggles to resolve conflicts over issues of values, the distribution  of
scarce resources and assets, and the allocation  of production  surpluses that often shape the interaction
of rulers and ruled.  As Laswell put it in 1936, political scientists  study "who  gets what, when, how?"
Institutional  economics commands  a broad scope of inquiry, nothing less than "the nature of
political and economic institutions and how they change" (North 1989: vii).  An interdisciplinary
marriage  of ecooromics  with other social  sciences  and history, institutional  economics  attempts  to extend
neoclassical  price theory by tracing the evolution  of the institutions  -- norms, rules, values, and patterns
of behavior  -- that affect the performance  of economic  and political systems.
Often  historical in  approach, an  important branch  of  institutional economics addresses
contemporary  "principal-agent"  problems: the dilemmas  faced by the state in its reliance on agents to
carry out revenue  collection  and service  delivery. 9 Neoclassical  economics  assumes  full information  and
'The  "agency problem" results "(w)hen the information  set available to one party to a contract
involving  two parties is not identical  to that available  to the other party, (and) one of the parties may
be able to engage in opportunistic  behavior  so as to increase  that party s benefits at the expense  of the
other's" (Nubli and Nugent 1989: 1337).  Agency theory is useful in explaining  outcomes involving
contract negotiation  and monitoring under conditions  of imperfect information  where the principal is
unable to control the behavior of the agent.  For more on agency theory, see M. K. Nabli and J. B.
Nugent, "NIE and Development",  World  Development  vol. 17, no. 9, September  1989; Pranab Bardhan,
10neglects the costs of market transactions, including  contract  enforcement. It ignores property  rights, or
assumes that they are fully defined.  By contrast, institutional economics emphasizes that "when
transaction costs are positive, the distribution  of political power within a country and the institutional
structure  of its rule-making  institutions  are critical  factors in economic  development"  (Eggertsson 1990:
248).
Development  management  explores  the operational  side of governance: improving  efficiency  in
the allocation  of resources  and expanding  participation  in allocation  decisions. Development  management
writing generally emphasizes  the empirical, focusing on projects, programs, and policies within the
context of public and private sector decision making and resource allocation.  As a multidisciplinary
field, development  management  draws on economics,  management,  and organization  theory, as well as
on sociology and political science."  Development  management writers frequently interpret more
theoretical  work in the social sciences to offer guidance to practitioners.  For example, a reading of
Weber's ideas on the norms of professionalism  that underlie predictability  in the "rational-legal  state"
might enrich a  discussion of public management training.  In addition, development management
highlights  the practical input of practitioners, and it has been influenced  by networks of management
institutions  in the developing  world, e.g., the Central American Management  Institute (INCAE),  IIMA
(Indian  Institute  of Management,  Ahmedabad),  and NIMD (Egyptian  National  Institute for Management
Development).
In general, analysts  from all three schools argue that contemporary  governance  problems  cannot
be  understood outside of  their political and historical context -- the  context that gives political
"The New Institutional  Economics  and Development  Theory:  A Brief Crizical  Assessment,"  in World
Development,  vol.  17, no. 9, September 1989; Richard  J. Arnott, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "The Basic
Analytics  of Moral Hazard,: Scandinavian  Journal of Economics  vol. 90, no. 3 1988; and Kathleen  M.
Eisenhardt, "Agency  Theory: An Assessment  and Review," Academy  of Management  Review  vol. 14,
no. 1 January 1989.
'"Much  of this field has gained its strongest intellectual  development  through leading  institutions  and
writers in India, notably  the Indian Institute  of Management  in Ahmedabad. See, in particular, Sharma
1978; Bhaduri  and Rahman 1982; Chatterjee and Gokhale 1974.
11"mismanagement"  its underlying logic and that creates the environment  in which economic activity
operates."
B.  Accountability
Although  the meanings and practices of accountability  follow changes  in societies, "it is found where
rulers readily delegate authority, where subordinates  confidently  exercise their discretion, where the
abuse of power is given its proper name and is properly punished under a rule of law which stands
above political faction" (Lonsdale 1986: 128, 135).  The literature defines accountability  in several
ways: political accountability,  public accountability  and legal accountability."2
Political accountability  is "the relative ability of divided peoples  to organise in order to choose
a ruler or government,  to remind  king or president of their promises, and to get rid of them if they fail
or refuse to abide by their mandate"  (Lonsdale 1986: 130). This involves,  inter alia, institutionalized
methods by which citizens can review government activities, question government ministers, review
public expenditures,  and remove officials who abuse the public trust.
Public accountability  concerns the methods and practices whereby users of government and
public services, and those within government  bureaucracies, ensure adequate  levels of public service.
Oversight problems, or  "principle-agent"  dilemmas, abound in the provision of public services, and
governments  have adopted  methods  ranging  from ombudsmen  to privatization  in order to promote public
accountability,  the practice  of which involves  both answering  up the chain of command  to superiors  and
outward .o the public.
"Though we have here surveyed only a limited subset of available, recent writing, the lessons  of
this review point clearly to the need to review the roots of recent literature in the classics of social
science for insights into governance  in developing  countries  today.  As Dunn notes, "There are no very
explicit modern theorists of good government  (as opposed  to good organisation)."  (Dunn 1986: 161,
note 12).
'2S. Paul (1990) uses a similar framework  of democratic, professional,  and legal accountability.
12Legal accountability  means that citizens  and groups can hold public agencies and civil servants
legally responsible for their actions.  Civil suits against the state are possible; a penal code regulates
both public and private behavior; and laws are enforced  through adequately  funded institutions  that are
independent of the political system.  Political corruption occasions real  risks and penalties, and
individuals  and groups that uncover abuses  or demand accountability  are legally  protected.
Accountability  thus has several related components:  (1) the existence of constitutional or
legislated  protection  of the public interest  through  a code that regulates  both public and private behavior;
(2) the enforcement  of such laws through specific  institutions  that receive  adequate  budgetary  allocations
and are independent  of the political system; and (3) a set of social expectations  shared by rulers and
ruled that provides the underpinnings  of enforcement  and compliance.
1.  Legitimacy,  Leadership, and Accountability
Jean-Jacques  Rousseau's 18th century idea of a social contract between rulers and ruled described a
bargain with mutual responsibilities,  but it also implied  -- much as the Chinese philosopher  Mencius
argued' 3 - that failure of the ruler to live up to his side of the bargain removed  his mandate. Thus the
failure of accountability  can lead to the loss of legitimacy. Even though legitimacy  cannot  be directly
addressed by institutions such as the World Bank, it is fundamental  to many analysts' conception  of
governance and accountability,  and the rule of law.  To be legitimate is to be "in accordance with
established rules, principles, or standards; lawful, legal."' 4 Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) defined
legitimacy as  "the capacity of the system to  create and maintain the belief that existing political
'3Mencius (c. 371-c. 289 B.C.) elaborated  the Confucian idea of governance by arguing that the
people had the right to overthrow a leader who lacked the necessary  moral qualities: such an act was
not regicide; since the ruler did not live up to the responsibilities  inherent in his title, he was not really
a ruler.
"Random House College  Dictionary, rev. ed. New York:  Random  House, 1984.
13institutions  and procedures are the most appropriate  ones for the society" (p. 77).  The effectiveness  of
a government is based in part on its level of legitimacy;  greater efficiency  comes from the promotion
of voluntary  compliance  with laws and regulations  rather than from reliance on coercion, threats, fear,
and personal loyalties. Citizens respect the procedures  and institutions  of legitimate  governments  even
if they may not respect particular  actors.
Traditional systems, according to  Max Weber, base governmental legitimacy on sacred and
inviolable  norms, and deeply held beliefs about appropriate  leadership, often with religious sanction.
While constitutional  legitimacy  depends on formal law to support accountability,  traditional legitimacy
depends on social pressures as much as on codified rules.  Richard Joseph (1990) suggests that "In
addition  to the establishment  of ombudsmen,  leadership  codes, special tribunals  and other well-tried  but
often unsuccessful  initiatives,"  countries should "explore customary  ways of compelling  accountability
that enabled chiefs, village  heads and councils  to govern their communities  while  being  held accountable
for their actions"  (p. 203).
More modern systems  base their legitimacy  on either charismatic-revolutionary  or constitutional
grounds. Charismatic-revolutionary  legitimacy  relies on appeals  to ideology  and emotion. Constitutional
legitimacy  is derived from adherence  to the rule of law and to valued, institutionalized  procedures  that
are considered morally proper and that generally include orderly, predictable transfers of power.
Constitutional  political systems build legitimacy  through institutions  that allow for citizen participation
in politics.  "It is the parliamentary  system of government  that is legitimate, and governrment  officials,
elected  through the institutions  of this system  of government,  acquire their authority  from the legitimacy
of the system" (Dawisha 1986).
In many parts of the world, with various political cultures and traditions of governance, the
legitimacy  of political systems rests on the person of the ruler.  Centralized  authority in many  areas, for
example, is based on  both traditions of hierarchy and strong personal leadership.  Legitimacy is
frequently  promoted and reinforced  through the use of ideology, images  and cultural symbols, and ties
14to historical  leaders.  Legitimacy  acquired in this manner is easily uprooted  and may ultimately  rest on
only lightly sheathed force.  Yet many local observers argue, as does Adeed Dawisha (1986), "in the
final analysis, only genuine participation in the political process can provide a  government with
unshakable  and permanent  legitimacy"  (p. 527).
2.  Accountability,  the State, and Civil Society
The existence of  constitutions and formal law  alone cannot explain the presence or  abs!nce of
accountability. Some political scientists  argue that political accountability  depends "almost entirely  on
the ability of civil society to curb the hegemony  of the state" (Chabal 1986: 13), while others point to
the East Asian experience  as a demonstration  that in order to be accountable  to society at large for the
country's economic  performance,  the "hard" state may insulate itself from particular interests in civil
society - for example, rent-seekers,  special interest groups, even labor (Haggard 1990).'5
The relationship between states, their  societies, and the development of  accountability is
controversial.  Many contend that problems of accountability  are rooted in an "all powerful state"
(World Bank 1989: 61).  In his analysis  of "strong societies  and weak states"  Joel Migdal  (1988) argues
that states with low accountability  and legitimacy  are engaged in a struggle  for survival; they are weak
states.  Weak states have not effectively  centralized  and institutionalized  their authority.  The struggle
to do so leads to the politicization  of the bureaucracy  and a lack of effectiveness,  accountability,  and
control. When  bureaucrats  and leaders attempt  to consolidate  the rule of law, their offices  are in danger
of capture by particularistic  interests.
'5Michael  Bratton's very thoughtful  article "Beyond  the State: Civil Society  and Associational  Life
in Africa,"(World Politics April 1989)  discusses  classical  conceptions  of civil society from Hegel (who
introduced the term), to Gramsci who saw civil society as the  "ideological  instruments (churches,
schools,  trade unions)"  of the state, and de Tocqueville,  who saw civil society  as "the ultimate  guarantee
that the state will be unable to arrogate to itself any more power than an active citizenry is willing to
grant" (pp. 416418).
15Migdal criticizes the tendency  of academics  and donors to simplify  bureaucratic  reform failures
as a product  of "slothfulness,  lack of will, and absence  of commitment."  He points out that bureaucrats
face a "calculus of pressures" that explains  apparent laziness and lack of commitment. If this is the
case, then "success  for public policies neither waits around the corner in a 'new breed' of implementor,
nor will it be found in an exclusive  focus  on new management  techniques." Attempts  to promote reform
must grapple with the "politics  of administration  in weak states," which "lies at the heart of problems
with policy implementation"  (p. 242).
One result of this state-society struggle is the fear by government officials of independent
economic power.  When the state is the primary route to  accumulation,  rent-seeking becomes an
important basis for  wealth, keeping control of  financial resources ultimately with the  state, but
hamnstringing  efficient  production. As Jean-Frangois  Bayart (1986) argues:  "Where there is a greater
distance  between  accumulation  and power,  there develop  autonomous  indigenous  business  classes  separate
from the bureaucracy  . ..  and capable of strengthening civil society" (p.  115-116).  Separating the state
from private sector  accumulation  provides  the basis  for building  a separate  economic  arena and ultimately
creates the constituency  that enforces  government  accountability. Some argue that greater participation,
plus a healthy sector of independent  local organizations  (institutional  pluralism) can also be important
channels  for structuring accountability.
3.  Accountability,  Participation, and Institutional  Pluralism
Political  scientists  use participation  as an umbrella  concept  embracing  activities  connected  to the exercise
of voice to affect government  decisions. Participation  can occur at a variety of levels -- on the national
or regional level, at the local level; it can link citizens  to decision making at projects and in villages,
16or in parliament." 6 The absence  of participation  affects  legitimacy  and may ultimately  call stability  into
question.' 7
Institutional  pluralism  refers to a diversity  of organizations,  a "market"  of institutions  in addition
to the state:  nongovernmental  organizations  (NOOs),  business  associations,  unions, youth and women's
groups, and other intermediate  organizations. Many describe  these institutions  as the vital structures  of
a civil society  composed  of autonomous  intermediate  organizations  (Bratton 1989; de Tocqueville  1966).
Although these organizations  may not have an explicitly  political role, ,  . ism has long represented
the idea of empowerment  for groups of people vis a vis the government. This leads many to regard
official tolerance for institutional pluralism as a vital precondition for effective power sharing and
representation  and for the institutionalization  of accountability: "Because  it raises questions about the
control of power and its purposes, accountability  must also be concernied  with political organisation.
For if power is not to  some extent shared there can be no effective base from which it may be
controlled,  nor any protected  right to discuss its pur?oses" (Lonsdale  1986: 128).
Whether electoral  or not, participation  creates channels  by which people influence  their leaders.
Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake (1990) criticizes  the "delinking  of leaders from their followers,
which, among other things, has led to a dissociation  of public policy from social needs and a lack of
accountability  and self-corrective  mechanisms  for public policy" (p. 15).  Ake argues convincingly  for
'6Lindblom's  (1977) hierarchy of political participation  demonstrates  the variety of acts included in
the exercise of voice.  Some are clearly electoral, but others are linked to  a  broader vision of
participation  as citizen action.  In Lindblom's hierarchy, electoral participation  includes regular voting
in national and local elections,  a-.tively  working  for a party or candidates  during an election, attending
political meetings  or rallies, giving money  to a party or candidate  during an election, or membership  in
a political club or organization. Community  participation  involves  activity in organizations  involved  in
community  problems, working with others to try and solve some community  problems, contacting  a
government  official (state or local) about some issue or problem; and forming a group or organization
to attempt to solve some community  problem.
'7Diamond,  Linz, and Lipset (1990) argue that one cause of the simmering  rebellion in Senegal's
isolated  southern Casamance  region is local resistance  to the promulgations  of a highly centralized  and
unresponsive state that lacked effective local channels for popular influence on policy.  Botswana
provides  a  contrast;  there,  locally  elected  councils  have  "substantial  power  . . . over  community
development  and services," and "opposition  party control  of some local councils  has mitigated  somewhat
the effect of continuing  one-party dominance  at the center and so enhanced  commitment  to the system"
(p.  30).
17a definition  of participation  that involves  not simply reacting to policies and programs, but of shaping
them:  "One is not just exercising a right of assenting  or dissenting  from outputs or options that are
already predetermined  by processes  over which one has no control whatsoever"  (p. 16).
A  plurality of  institutions outside of  the  government offers  opportunities for  informal
representation, enabling people to  "reach up" to  governments.  Yet although effective government
provides opportunities  for its citizens  to make known  their views, political scientists  like Patrick Chabal
(1986) argue that there exists "no causal link between  the mechanisms  of formal representation  and the
effectiveness  of government"  (p. 14).  Can the development  of commurity-based  popular  organizations
reinforce accountability  by constraining  government  agency  abuses? Robin  Theobald (1990) argues that
basing structures of accountability  in  local community  organizations risks their overpowerment  by
national  needs (p. 155). However, analysis  of the Asian niewly  industrialized  countries (NICs) suggests
that their authoritarian  national  governments  were tempered by member-controlled,  local organizations
that channeled  rural concerns  to the stace  (Korten 1990). Development  management  analysts  argue  that
effective  interaction  between  local groups  and government  depends  on formal instruments  of power held
by community  groups:  "to the extznt that they contribute to salaries, or  influence  promotions, or
determine  work priorities, local communities  or groups can compel field staffs to be more responsive
to their concerns"  (UTphoff  and Esman 1984: 148).
The development  management  literature documents  the important  role local participation  plays
in increasing  the effectiveness  of project and program  decisions,  not simply  through accountability,  but
in increasing  the appropriateness  of project investments. A number of evaluations  and studies by the
World Bank and other development agencies support the view that popular participation  enhances
sustainability,  particularly  for family planning,  local irrigation,  agricultural  extension, urban upgrading,
and community  water supply (see, among  others, Bryant and White 1984; World Bank 1985; Midgley
et al 1986). Development  management  researcher Louise White (1989) has outlined steps to enhance
project  and  program  accountability that  substitute for  hierarchical control:  "mobilizing local
organizations to  hold managers and staff accountable; setting up procedures so that proposals by
18beneficiaries  are part of the ongoing information  system in the agency; meeting in work groups where
staff have access to external  professionals;  instituting  process documentation  so that all can learn from
the actual steps taken; and relying on pilot projects and experiments  to test out new ideas" (p.  179-
180).
Corporatism, a "system of interest representation"  that provides for the state's organization  of
"hierarchically  ordered and functionally  differentiated"  interests, such as business, women, peasants,
workers, presents an alternative  method  by which some  governments  structure, and limit, participation.' 8
Those not represented  by these institutions  are left outside  of the structures  of power.  This process of
incorporation often proceeds against the will of  the incorporated groups, although the European
experience  with corporatism  suggests  that "peak  associations  with a secure place in the political process
and clear access to decision making can guarantee  mutual restraint and efficient decision making in a
democratic  setting" CTheobald  1990: 85, 263).  Latin American  states experimented  perhaps more than
others with controlled participation  and limited accountability  through corporatist structures that gave
specific interest groups a formal role in government  decision  processes. Many of these states are now
experimenting  with decentralization,  in the hope that this will enhance governmental  accountability  to
society at large.
'8For a review of the literature on corporatism, see Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of
Corporatism?"  Review  of Politics  36, 1, 1974;  Doug  Chalmers,  "Corporatism  and Comparative  Polities,"
in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., New Directions in Comparative  Politics (Boulder:  Westview Press, 1985);
for the European experience,  see Leo Panitch, 1980, "Recent  lheorizations of Corporatism:  Reflections
on a Growth  Industry,"  British  Journal of Sociology  31, 2; for Latin America, see Howard  Wiarda, 1981
Corporatism  and National Development  in Latin America (Boulder:  Westview  Press); and volumes  by
Alfred Stepan, Peter Evans, Guillermo  O'Donnell.  For Africa, see in particular the various essays in
the volume  edited by Julius Nyang'oro and Timothy  Shaw,  Corporatism  in Africa: Comparative  Analysis
and Practice (Boulder:  Westview  Press, 1989).  and the subsequent  article by Nyang'oro, "The State of
Politics in Africa: The Corporatist  Factor," Studies in Comparative  International  Development  (Spring
1989); and Timothy Shaw, 1982, "Beyond Neo-Colonialism:  Varieties of  Corporatism in  Africa,"
Journal of Modem African Studies 20, 2.
194.  Conclusion: Accountability  and Foreign Aid
Accountability  depends in part on "appropriate  and effective  accounting  systems within or outside the
government,  on people who are trained and motivated  to manage and operate these systems  and on the
availability  of hardware  and other ancillary  systems, such as working  telephone  links, necessary  for the
collection and dissemination  of data and the processing of information"  (Corkery 1990: 10).  Foreign
aid has  an  important role  in  assisting the development of  these technical supports for  greater
accountability. But the historical  discussion  of accountability  developed  earlier suggests  that foreign  aid
may also have contributed  indirectly  to problems of accountability  currently facing many nations.
First, foreign aid in many  parts of the world reduced the need for national  governments  to raise
taxes locally in order to fund their governmental  programs.  When aid transfers make up the bulk of
government  budgets, governments  face less domestic pressure to be accountable, because  they do not
often need to negotiate  with their citizens  over taxation. When government revenues  and spending are
dependent  on direct taxation  of citizens,  pressure builds to be accountable  for the use of those revenues.
Second, in many developing areas, extensive amounts  of outside aid enabled the solidification
of government's position as the primary source of capital accumulation.  Without international  aid
transfers, governments  lacking extensive  natural resources may have been forced to seek more revenue
from other sources,  thus giving them a greater interest in providing a conducive environment  for
productive activities. The private sector, on the other hand, responded  to the natural incentive  structure
that resulted: they sought  rents rather than engaging  in risky production  ventures; they exported capital
rather than investing it locally.
Thus, foreign aid may hamper the state-society  dialogue and may have distorted development
choices in the many nations  that remain heavily dependent  on these outside funds.  While foreign aid
was originally designed to  fill critical savings and skills shortages, in the process it inadvertently
contributed  to critical  political shortages. Lack of accountability  has been  an inevitable  and perhaps quite
20natural result.  This strongly suggests  that those who channel funds to foreign governments  must find
ways in which to stimulate  and support the process by which accountability  becomes  a matter primarily
between  governments  and citizens, and not only one between governments  and donors.
C.  Openness  and Transparency
The development  of accountability,  whether international,  national, or local, requires an underpinning
of information  and a system that is open to the discovery  and correction  of abuses of power.  Openness
has several meanings, but they all  refer to  low levels of  government conirols on  the flows of
commodities, ideas, information, and participation. The Soviet struggles to institutionalize  glasnost
focused international  attention  on openness  as a  governance  concept.  While perestroika  referred  to
economic  restructuring  and greater reliance on the market to allocate goods, glasnost came to mean a
relaxing of controls  on information  flows, on expression  and association,  and on political participation.
Economic openness refers to competitive  economies with limited restrie~tions,  a liberal trade
regime, and a variety of cross border transactions.  In an open economy, goods and resources are
allocated primarily by market forces.  Entry into the economy is not restricted by government fiat or
by other artificial barriers.  Unimpeded  flows of financial and economic  information  are fundamental
to the effective  working of the market, and they underpin economic  openness.
Political openness  refers to political competitiveness,  tolerance  for diversity, and policy making
ultimately  dependent on expressions  of citizen preference, such as the vote (Dahl 1971: 3).  Included
in political openness are contestable  leadership and institutionalized  procedures for political transitions
(generally  through fair elections). Access  to information  and freedom  of expression  are fundamental  to
the responsible exercise of  voice; a wide range of government information is accessible through
published  gazettes and other public records, and confidential  classifications  are strictly limited.
21Political  openness  includes  the institutionilization  of channels  of communicav  )n between  citizens
and officials, as opposed to  personalized channels, which empower special interests and provide
opportunities  for corruption.  Openness  in this sense correlates with expanded options for specialized
interest groups, mass media, and other non-governmental  institutions that provide checks on public
officials and enhance accountability. The information  revolution created a new dimension to cross
border information  flows, expanding  the options for "openness"  beyond the press and the media, to
personal  computers, fax machines  tape recorders, and videos (Annis 1990).
Transparent decision-making  processes and the availability  of information  constitute  important
dimensions  of openness. Governments  can promote transparency  even when the system is not open in
the economic or political sense, although experience suggests that the high degree of governmental
discretion  in command  economies  may impede  transparency. Transparent  systems  have clear procedures
for public decision making; they publish budget information, including military expenditures, and
minimize "caisses noires"  and other hidden budget categories.  Subsidies are clearly stipulated;
appointing,  promoting,  and dismissing  personnel  done according  to stated,  objective  criteria. Information
availability  can range from requirements  such as the publishing  of audited accounts  that add confidence
to capital markets, to the disclosure  of procurement  procedures and the release of complete national
budgets.
Distinguishing  these separate aspects of openness is necessary in order to relate "openness"  to
econo..iic  performance,  discussed  below. Many aspects  of openness  can be traced to capacity  problems,
rather than to conscious  decisions  to restrict access. Funding  for compiling  economic  statistics may be
absent; auditors may not be available; those available may not be well trained.  Mechanisms  that
impede information  flows  may not signal  deliberate  closure,  yet these can affect performance. One kind
of openness  may be present and others missing: closed polities but extensive foreign investment  and
sophisticated  market information  systems characterize  some of the Asian NICs.  While committed  to a
degree of economic  liberalization,  some of these countries  were not willing  to allow wide public access
to sensitive financial  data.  Nor were they willing to embrace  greater tolerance for divergent political
22perspectives. In short, economic  openness  does not readily translate into political openness.  Yet, as
touched on above, recent experience  in the Asian N[Cs (Korea, Taiwan) provides some evidence  that
sustaining  open economies  in the long term appears to require political openness, at least guarantees  of
certain political  freedoms  such as speech,  association  and the media, as spelled  out in the United  Nations
Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights (1983).'9
Albert Hirschman  (1970) notes that systems that punish wavering loyalty lower the quality of
information  that reaches  the leadership,  and close themselves  to important  feedback  that would improve
accountability.  Closure also multiplies  opportunities for corruption.  Theobald's (1990) thoughtful
review of corruption in less developed  countries defines corruption as "the illegal use of public office
for private gain."  Theobald  notes a number  of ways in which societies  have reduced their tolerance  for
corruption, although scandals  continue to plague rich and poor countries alike.  Theobald shows how
the development  of civil society as a balance  to the state eventually  reshaped  government  behavior. In
Europe, for example, the synergistic  development  of the private and non-governmental  sectors, a free
press, citizen groups, and the growth of social expectations  that the government  must be accountable  to
the people  redefined  acceptable  behavior  by public  officials  and induced  pressure  to increase  transparency
and lower corruption.
Theobald  traces the gradual discontinuation  in Europe  of behaviors now considered  corrupt but
once considered  quite normal. In part, this evolution  came about  througlh  the development  of alternative
economic  bases outside both the aristocracy  and the government,  as well as through the development  of
a rational-legal  bureaucracy  based on predictability. Such a historical  view can offer some consolation
to those who view endemic  governmental  corruption in many societies  today.
'9See, for example, Article 19, which states: "Everyone  has the right to freedcm of opinion and
expression;  this right includes  freedom to hold opinions without interference  and to seek, receive and
impart information  and ideas through any media and regardless  of frontiers;" and Article 20: "Everyone
has the right to freedom of peaceful  assembly  and association."
23Privatization, or the reduction of government controls and regulations and the sale of public
enterprises to the private sector, has potential to increase transparency  and reduce corruption abuses.
White (1989) cautions  that privatization  may not enhance  accountability  or efficiency  if the service is a
monopoly, is not purchased, or it oversight  and regulation  are not in place.
Lack of transparency is clearly not the only factor involved in corruption.  Weber noted that
regular salaries are one distinguishing  characteristic  of rational  bureaucracies,  as they provide for more
effective  government control over off-icials. Chrnic  fiscal crises, and problems  with regular payment
of salaries, distance officials from that government control while also providing strong incentives  to
supplement  income  from corruption. Dimiiinishing  corruption  is related  not only to civil sern-:e reform,
but very fundamentally  to issues of the distribution  and nature of power and to those of accountability.
As Lonsdale (1986) puts it,  "Effective power can scarcely avoid submitting itself to  some test of
accountability"  (p. 128).  Without accountability,  corruption  and power frequently coexist.  As Lord
Acton noted in another contex.:  "Power  tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
In a related argument, Larry Diamond (1988) contends that in some countries, bureaucratic
employment  became a major avenue of wealth through political corruption, distorting entrepreneurial
incentives,  and putting an "economic  premium on political power."  A vicious circle can result, based
on a scarcity of productive economic  options and exacerbated  by a restrictive  state which controlled  the
economy. Echoing Hyden,  Diamond  stresses  that only with the development  of market-based  production
opportunities would entrepreneurs  have alternative  bases of wealth; only then, might the emergence  of
an entrepreneurial  class force the attachment of "real  risks and penalties . . . to  the pursuit  of wealth
through political corruption" (pp. 384, 403).
24D.  Predictability and the Rule of Law
"A market," comments  Jeremy Paltiel (1989), "is not just an economic  mechanism;  it is a legal regime"
(p. 266).  The development  of a rule of law establishes  the standards of accountability  against which
both public and private sector actions  are measured. It regulates  the market system  through establishing
exclusive property rights, the sanctity of contract, and common standards -- all of which underpin
mirket exchanges  (Cerny 1990: 206). It provides  the conditions  under which openness  and transparency
become the norm in public-private  transactions.
Discussions of the rule of law and governance are among the oldest existing philosophical
debates. More than two thousand  years ago, Confucian  thinking  stressed moral institutions  as the basis
of government,  but the rival Legalist school argued that governments  should be based on a fixed code
of law.  The Legalists  viewed law as an impartial instrument,  developed  by leaders, and necessary  not
so much  for controlling  leaders as for controlling  both the people and office holders.'  This distinction
between  normative and instrumentalist  views of law finds reflection in Western legal theory as well. 2'
The "rule of law" may be defined as "the subordination  of the behavior of state officials to
rational, predictable, and publicly recognized procedures" (Paltiel 1989: 266).  It  is  an essential
precondition  for accountability,  and predictability. A rule of law implies  standard  operating  procedures,
clearly promulgated  and indiscriminantly  applied rules, non-personalized  decision making with modest
levels of discretion, and regularized  procedures  for establishing  and implementing  policies.  In systems
with high predictability,  lines of authority  are clear and capriciousness  at a minimum. The civil service
2'For the Chinese  Legalists, even service  delivery accountability  rests on this instrumentalist  vision
of law: once an individual  is given an office, "the functions  pertaining  to this office have already been
defined by law . . . the ruler need not, and should not, bother about the methods  used to carry out his
work, so long as the work itself is done and well done. If it is well done, the ruler rewards him; if not,
he punishes him . . . if the ruler is strict  in his rewards  and punishments,  incompetent people will no
longer dare to take office even if it is offered to them.  Thus all incompetents  are eliminated" (Feng
1948: 161).
2 "See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,  MA: The Belknap  Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971), for example, for a discussion  of contending  approaches  to the law.
25is insulated  from politics  rather than penetrated  by it; when political  leadership  changes,  the civil service
acts as a stabilizing  source of continuity. But no system of law, whether  constitutional  in origin or not,
can persist over time unless the laws themselves  represent  the crystalization  of society's values and are
seen as legitimate.
This crystalization  is a topic of research  for many  political scientists  as well, who are concerned
with  political stability as  a  function of  regularized patterns of  interaction, and  the  successful
institutionalization  of rules, norms, and procedures. Samuel Huntington  set the terms for the modern
discussion  of post-Weberian  rationalization  in Political  Order in Changing  Societies  (1968) in which he
argued  that social  and economic  change  breeds instability  when it destroys  traditional  institutions  without
creating "new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and
effectiveness." Huntington  pointed out that:
political institutions  have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak
political institutions  lacks the ability  to curb the excesses  of personal  and parochial  desires
. . . Morality requires trust; trust involves predictability; and predictability requires
regularized  and institutionalized  patterns  of behavior. Without  strong  political  institutions,
society lacks the means to define and to realize its common interests (pp. 12, 5, 24).
Development  management  and public administration  theorists  focus much  of their field of inquiry
on the practical aspect of these questions: how can institutional  evolution  be accelerated? They argue
that while change occurs slowly, institutions are social creations, and hence can be modified by
purposive action.  The learning process that underlies  directed institutional  and organizational  change
occurs most efficiently when an organization can "embrace error"  and promote conscious social
adaptation  (Korten 1980).2
'For  a review of the material in this field, see Coralie Bryant and Louise G. White, Managing
Development  in the Third World (Boulder,  CO: Westview  Press, 1982).
26The work of Douglass North and other institutional  economists  explores  the origins of the legal
and political institutions  that create  predictability  through defining  clear property rights.  Property rights
are rarely defined by economists, yet their importance  is never doubted.  The definition problem is
serious, however. Barzel defines  property  rights of individuals  over assets as "the rights, or the powers,
to consume,  obtain income from, and alienate  those assets" (p. 2).  By this definition,  one's "property"
includes  one's labor.'
The structure and enforcement  of ownership rights determines economic  incentives and their
stability and predictability. How do these rights evolve?  States interact with their societies over the
definition  (and redefinition)  of property rights, the provision  of public goods such as infrastructure,  and
the establishment  of standard weights and measures -- all of which lower transaction  costs ("the costs
associated  with the transfer, capture, and protection  of rights" Barzel 1989: 2).  As economies  develop,
legal institutions and property rights evolve to support transactions that increase in complexity and
impersonality. Mercantilist  economies,  with highly liquid investments,  differ from industrial and post-
industrial economies, which require institutions that provide secure and impartial enforcement of
property rights through contracts.  Economic development  depends critically on these state actions,
although states will define property rights in different ways depending  on the "distribution  of political
power within  a country and the institutional  structure  of its rule-making  institutions"  (Eggertsson  1990:
247-248).
The rule of law is also essential in another respect -- to protect the rights of citizens in their
efforts to force accountability  from governments. In Latin America, "crucial  individual  and collective
rights were made effective  before the convocation  of competitive  elections,  the organization  of effective
interest representation,  and the submission  of executive  authority  to popular accountability"  (O'Donnell
and Schmitter 1986).  Yet the relation of political rights to  governance is not necessarily direct.
Historically, in the long term, political rights and personal  or human rights appear to be necessary  to
'Barzel,  in fact, argues that "the distinction  sometimes  made between property rights and human
rights is spurious.  Human rights are simply part of people's property rights.  Human rights may be
difficult  to protect or exchange, but so are rights to many  other assets' (p. 2).
27underpin market systems.  Free movement  of goods, freedom to establish businesses, security from
arbitrary  expropriations -- property rights -- are all related to the protection of personal liberties.
The establishment  of appropriate  legal systems  takes time, particularly  when they must support
rapid econemic  transition,  from command  to market systems,  or from a pre-capitalist  to a fully capitalist
economy. Governance  reforms in Eastern Europe  may learn from China's struggles  to establish  the rule
of law.  Before December  1978, "laws -- administrative, criminal,  civil, or commercial  -- were largely
nonexistent"  (Paltiel 1989:  260). The post-Mao  introduction  of new laws  failed to establish  predictability
in  enforcement, or  to  draw clear distinctions between ad  hoc administrative decrees and formal
legislation. Party control substituted  for the rule of law:  Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng admitted in
1980  that "there are no systematic  and practicable  administrative  rules which define limits of power and
responsibilities  and lay down administrative  procedure" (Paltiel 1989: 261)."  Legal reforms in the past
decade have contributed  to stronger protection  of physical  and intellectual  property in China, and they
have supported the surge of domestic investments  there.
Paltiel (1989) argues that  in  some countries, where law  and property rights are  weak,
entrepreneurs seek to enhance security and reduce their risks through finding governmental  patrons to
protect their business activities. This clientelism,  he suggests, becomes "the functional  substitute  for
property rights" (p. 257).  Weak property rights exacerbate a situation of personalized  bureaucratic
relations, undermining  "contract,  law, and property,  thereby  reducing  calculabilty  and adding  an element
of political risk to every business transaction"  (p. 267).  Ultimately, the strengthening  of clientelism
"subverts  the impersonal  operation of predictable  rational-legal  norms within the state.  Instead of the
abstractions  of hierarchy  and market, human  relations  become  the essential  matrix of economic  behavior"
(p.  272).  Entrepreneurs spend their  energies seeking special exemptions and  bargaining with
bureaucrats, instead  of upgrading  productivity  and efficiency.
Establishing  the rule of law is a process involving  effective  communication  of the content of the
laws.  It involves  predictable  and legally enforceable  methods  for changing  the content of the laws, so
28that ad hoc decrees do not continually  change the legal and regulatory environment,  rendering both
people and their property insecure. It also involves  the effective enforcement  of law through adequate
budgets, salaries, staff, and workable  institutions. Governments  may enact and promulgate  laws, but
this  hardly guarantees their  enforcement.  Larry  Diamond (1989) comments that  constitutional
establishment  of codes of conduct  and monitoring  tribunals  to address  public corruption  may be thwarted
without enabling  legislation  and an independent  budget (pp. 384-385).
Some institutional  economists  argue that institutionalizing  the rule of law may necessitate  certain
kinds of government structures: "In modern nations, [credible commitments  by the state to  stable
property  rights] seem to require an effective  separation  of powers" (Eggertsson  1990:348). Historically,
many European  political scientists  and jurists have argued for the central importance  of an independent
judiciary in ensuring the rule of law.
Finally, the rule of law is closely intertwined  with legitimacy,  whether  based on traditional law
(patrimonial legitimacy) or  modern law (rational-legal legitimacy).  In  many post-colonial areas,
European legal systems were imposed  through conquest  or implemented  adjacent  to indigenous  legal
systems.  In Europe these systems  grew out of traditional norms and experience,  but they were not so
rooted in the former colonies. They lacked the legitimacy  of tradition. In many parts of the developing
world, the legal framework acts to support the interests of elites and to suppress the economic  and
political participation  of the poor.  As Rhoda Howard (1985) points out:  "The key to legitimacy  will
be,  however, not the  indigenous nature of  the law,  but  whether it  is perceived to  be  fair and
nonarbitrary. The criteria of fairness will depend  not upon the law itself, but upon public consciousness
of how [ruling  class elites] accrue political  and economic  privilege,  and the public  perception  of whether
or not such privilege is, in its turn,  legitimate" (p. 347).
29111.  DOES  GOVERNANCE  MATIER?  GOVERNANCE  AND ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE
Empirical work on the relationship  between governance and economic  performance reveals a mixed
record.  There does, however, appear to be evidence  that (1) the impact  of government  on economic
performance is more substantial than some economic  theory acknowledges,  and (2) failure to meet
minimal  performance  levels can cause both the public and investors to withdraw confidence.
The possibility that political interventions  are determinant in the "black box" within which
economic  policies  are made now enjoys a growing  consensus. For example,  economist  L. G. Reynolds'
analysis of economic  growth from 1850  to 1950 in forty developing  countries suggested  that "political
organization  and the administration  of government"  constituted  "the single most important  explanatory
variable" (Reynolds 1983: 976).
Governance  may well be the independent  variable  determining  "who  gets what, when, and how."
Yet empirical  research relating  specific aspects  of governance  to economic  performance  is quite scarce.
Most of the political science literature reverses the dependent  and independent  variables, examining  the
impact of economic  conditions  on the development  of democratic institutions. Those who do address
the issue of government and economic performance tend to  examine regime-types (authoritarian,
patrimonial, democratic, etc.)  rather than  the  narrower elements we  are  concerned with  here
(accountability,  openness, predictability). Their conclusions  support the practical view that in its earlier
stages, economic growth is correlated with adherence so known policies:  good fiscal management,
skillful  use of government  instruments  to managi,  the market, competitive  enterprise systems  that reward
performance,  broad-based  education,  and support for the rule of law.  These policies show up in both
authoritarian  and democratic  regimes.
30A.  Accountability  and Economic  Performance
The relationship  of accountability  to economic  performance  is contingent  upon numerous intervening
variables; there is  no  clear evidence that accountability "guarantees social justice and  economic
development"  (Lonsdale 1986: 128; Dunn 1986: 173).
The Asian NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore)  provide a useful foil for this discussion. Although
for most of their modern  history these nations  have been nondemocratic,  their governments  drew much
of their legitimacy  from deeply held social norms, based on their responsibility  for the performance  of
the national economy and their position as  small neighbors of  larger and  potentially threatening
countries. 24 The powerful capacity  of these governments  to select and implement  their chosen policies,
together with the integrity  of the government bureaucracy,  explains much of their economic  success,
which in turn enhances  legitimacy. They are accountable  to their people for economic  performance.
The skill of the NIC governments  is self-evident. Yet skill levels are also a function  of political
decisions.  Governments  decide where to allocate scarce resources:  to education, or to  parastatal
subsidies, for example.  They create the conditions under which skills can be effectively use-J  In
addition, a number of the developing  world's most skilled public servants  have left their countries, not
only for financial  reasons, but also to escape the frustration of corruption, rent-seeking,  and patronage
politics.
Although legitimacy  is not spelled out as a governance  variable in this review, its absence can
affect economic  performance. Regimes  that lack legitimate  authority tend to rely on military  or police
force and the suppression  of civil liberties to retain their control.  Research by Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset (1989) reminds  us that governments  starting with low legitimacy  often must allocate substantial
4The  Chinese political philosopher Mencius argued more than two thousand years  ago that
governments based on "wang" must take the lead in building the economic  base for supporting their
people.  The ultimate symbol of the failure of governments  to protect the people came from famine-
the symbolic  signal of  Heaven's withdrawal  of the mandate  from the ruler, and the end of a dynasty.
31military  and police resources simply  to control  society and monitor  social activity. In circular fashion,
concentrating  on coercion and control, rather then consensus,  may affect development  effectiveness,
lowering  economic  performance,  and making legitimacy  even more difficult  to establish (p. 10).
Governance  based on personal loyalties, patron-client  ties, appeals to particular ethnic groups,
or through  the "purchase"  of allegiance  offers only limited  legitimacy. Regimes  with low legitimacy  are
more subject  to the frequent use of force, for citizens  are apt to challenge  the government  through riots,
demonstrations,  and strikes (Avery 1988: 113). Their military budgets may absorb a large portion of
the nation's scarce resources -- and often for use against their own people.  The absence of legitimacy
occasions  instability  and eventually  may lead to violent overthrow  of the government. In systems with
high legitimacy, citizens may be more willing to save, to defer gratification,  and to accept unpopular
government  decisions in the belief that the government  is acting in their interests.
B.  Participation,  Institutional  Pluralism,  and Economic  Performance
Are participation  and institutional  pluralism  related to economic  performance? Some evidence  suggests
a correlation between popular participation  and broad-based  growth.  Morris and Adelman's (1989)
extensive  study of nineteenth  century  development  examined  35 institutional  and economic  variables  for
23 countries,  comparing  paths of development  from 1850-1914.  Empowerment  and participation  figured
strongly in the second of their two generalizable  findings:  "Progressive  agriculture  is necessary  (but not
sufficient)  to sustained  industrialization;  increased  political  power to nonelite  groups is essential  (but not
sufficient)  to government  policies that spread growth widely" (p. 1428).
Huntington and  Nelson (1976) introduced some complications into these findings in their
argument that effective land reform, one of the key components to later economic equality, is best
introduced  under "noncompetitive  and nondemocratic  governments,"  i.e., those with low participation.
32When medium-sized  landowners are able to use legislative  means to obstruct reforms, "land reform
becomes  difficult or impossible"  (p. 76).2
As mentioned above, development  management  researchers draw a strong correlation between
participation  in the design and implementation  of development  projects and the sustainability  of project
benefits (Bryant and White 1984; Uphoff and Esman 1984; Cernea 1985; Salmen 1987; World Bank
1985).  Economic performance on  the micro-level can be  strengthened by citizen participation,
particularly by grassroots organizations able to  influence project design decisions and affect the
management  of project activities.  Some evidence  exists as well that economic  policy reforms may be
more  sustainable when governments consult with  major  societal groups  during  planning and
implementation  of adjustment  (Nelson 1989, 1990; White 1989).
But interest group influence  has its dangers, as well as its potential  benefits. Trade associations
and other lobbying groups can influence the design and enforcement of economic policy in both
productive and non-productive  ways.  Rational  choice economist  Mancur Olson (1981)  has argued that
pressure by economic interest groups in advanced industrialized  nations led to policy decisions  that
lowered economic  performance. Olson argues that the problems  of collective  action - free riders, the
need for  selective incentives, the  near impossibility of  organizing mass groups  (the poor,  the
unemployed, consumers) to bargain for their common interests, in contrast to the relative ease with
which some  groups (smaller, better established,  or with specific  purposes)  org,anize  to push their interests
- make it unlikely that any society will achieve equity or  efficiency through comprehensive  group
bargaining.  It is more likely that small groups will exercise "lobbying and cartelistic power" for
redistribution  on behalf of their special interests  -- to push society  away from equity  and efficiency;  i.e.,
it is easier to bargain over a slice of the pie than to join forces to  make the pie bigger.  These
distributive coalitions (labor unions, special interest lobbies, industry cartels, collusive firms, etc.)
maintain  barriers to entry and exit, establish  monopoly  rents, and create rigidities  that lower the ability
"Interestingly, for  the  Chinese philosopher Mencius, the  economic basis of  kingly (J)
government  rested on equal land distribution  [Fung, p. 75].  Unequal  distribution  led to unequal  growth,
which might eventually  lead to peasant uprisings  that could  bring down a dynasty.
33of the economy to "adapt to change and generation  new innovations"  (p. 62).  As these distributive
coalitions increase  in  number,  Olson  argues,  regulations increase  in  complexity, government
bureaucracies  expand, and growth slows.
In this vein, many  of those who study the Asian NICs argue that the autonomy  of the state from
social groups enabled it to conduct economic  policy free from distributive  pressures.  As mentioned
earlier, Stephan Haggard (1990) argues that low formal participation  -- limits on party representation,
interest group formatioi.,  and labor organization  -- allowed political space for these Asian governments
to move rapidly in devising, adjusting, and implementing  growth-oriented  policies without  significant
societal  pressures.  Each of the Asian NICs he examined  was marked by "tightly controlled"  channels
of representation, and economic policymaking  processes "relatively insulated from direct political
pressures  and compromises" (p. 262).
The case of the authoritarian but developmental  NICs raises important questions about the
fundamental  nature of accountability  and its relationship  to pluralist systems based on representation.
Most political scientists educated in the Western European tradition link accountability  directly to
electoral representation, even though the literature does not support clear causality.  If  rulers are
ultimately  accountable  to their people fer the performance  of the economy, as Mencius believed, then
a  measure of  accountability existed even  in  the  non-pluralist authoritarian states that  lacked
reprcsentation,  but had fairly honest rulers, low corruption, and equitable income distribution. Given
the events  of the past few years in Korea and Taiwan, however, acquiescence  in a nonrepresentative  but
prosperous system may be only temporary.  Sooner or later, people seem to demand the right to
participate  in society's major decisions.
34C.  Openness, Transparency,  and Economic  Performance
Although economic openness has been correlated with economic efficiency since the days of Adam
Smith, other aspects  of openness  are less clearly empirically  related to development. With the possible
exception  of Japan with its contestable  political system and respect for civil liberties, the industrialized
countries of  Asia achieved their remarkable economic performance with carefuliy circumscribed
economic  openness,  and  very  little political  openness.  These  countries  are  distinguished  by  strong
commitment  to education, and a  "rigorously educated  elite" (Johnson 1987: 152).  Ir. addition, they
frequently created a  politically insulated bureaucratic elite,  with planning concentrated in  semi-
autonomous  institutes  and councils. And in the early stages, they generally  manifested  neither political
openness, nor conventional  separation  of powers.
Political  openness, in the sense of democratic  processes  and electoral  representation,  has received
considerable  attention in the literature. However, as mentioned  above, the choice of the dependent  and
independent  variables does not alway provide much evidence  on the economic  performance  effect of
open polities.  Tatu Vanhanen's (1990) speculation about the relationship between representative
governments  and economic  pe.formance hypothesizes  that market-based  economies provide economic
bases for the political activities of interest groups, leading to pressures for the expansion  of political
rights (p. 172). However, Vanhanen's  empirical  work suggests  that in the long term, effective  political
participation  and "popular  accountability"  are correlated  not simply  with market  systems, but on an equal
distribution  of economic  power resources (wealth and assets), and on education  (pp. 191, 195).
In other senses, such as transparency, openness is often relevant to the performance of an
economy, or at least its absence opens a system to abuse without counterbalancing  controls.  Some
specific examples  exist in the literature  of the economic  cost of a lack of transparency  in the form of a
highly Jiscretionary bureaucracy. High levels of executive  discretion can "weaken  auditing, oversight
and planning"  leading  to "increasing  uncertainty,  loss of confidence,  a decline  in productive  invesiment,
capital flight, and finally, open political opposition"  (Haggard 1990: 128).  Yet, paradoxically, high
35levels  of discretion are not always  correlated  with poor growth. Many  countries  with superior economic
performance  exercise a high degree of discretion, rewarding  performance, channeling  extra resources
toward high efficiency  activities,  and even "negotiating  all investments  on a case-by-case  basis" (Haggard
and Cheng 1987: 116).
We have argued above that lack of transparency  can promote corruption, with its own impact
on economic  performance. Some have argued that corruption  provides economic  benefits; in effect, in
countries with uneven adherence  to formal rules of law, corruption can increase predictability  through
lowering risks, offering a form of insurance, and softening the distortions  of quotas and licenses by
creating a de facto market for their allocation.'  Yet corruption clearly wastes national resources,
undermining  stability  and adniinistrative  capacity, and postponing  the evolution  of bureaucracies  based
on universalistic  criteria.  But perhaps the most serious consequence  of corruption is that it erodes the
confidence of citizens in government -- it undermines legitimacy.  As that happens, gover!-.nents
encounter even greater problems acquiring  strength to enact policies and to implement  them.
Corruption  obviously  affects  the ability  of the state to husband  and allocate scarce resources, but
there is some evidence  to show that problems  of corruption  eventually  recede as alternative  avenues  to
wealth occupy the attention of entrepreneurs and a&  affective and kinship ties are replaced by more
impersonal  relationships.
"Nathaniel Leff suggests  that in the lengthy  period before both external  and internal  pressures  push
the development  of  bureaucracies with Weberian, universalistic norms,  corruption can "lubricate
administrative  rigidities," cutting through restrictive business regulations and eliminating red tape.
Theobald  notes this in his admission  that corruption "assists  capital formation;  it fosters entrepreneurial
abilities; allows business interests to penetrate the bureaucracy  and, lastly, pernits  the logic of the
market to insinuate  itself into transactions  from which public controls attempt  to exclude it" (Theobald,
p. 116). For one of the latest contributions  to this debate, see M. S. Alam, "Some  Economic  Costs of
Corruption  in LDCs", Journal of Development  Studies, vol. 27, October 1990, pp. 89-97.
36D.  Predictability,  the Rule of Law, and Economic Performance
Adam Smith commented  in 1755  on the importance  of the rule of law for economic  prosperity: "Little
else is required to carry a state to the hig;iest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarianism, but
peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration  of justice; all the rest being brought about by the
natural course of things."
Economic  policies always encounter  uncertainties. These uncertainties  are worsened,  however,
when there is great capriciousness  or instability surrounding  either the way policies are made or by
whom they are made.  Predictability is essential for long-term capital investment.  Market-based
economies  depend on legal regimes composed  of property rights and the sanctity of contracts. A legal
system and government  administration  in harmony  with the market enhance  predictability,  calculability,
and efficiency. This relationship  reduces transaction  costs and makes  possible the interactive  economic
management  needed for economic  performance.
A major vehicle for this predictability, as argued above, is well-defined  and protected legal
rights, particularly  property rights.  According  to North and Thomas (1973):  "Economic  growth will
occur  if  property rights  make  it  worthwhile to  undertake socially productive activity" (p.  8).
Institutional  economics  theorists  argue that economies  need incentives  to operate close to the technical
production  frontier; incentives  depend  on the structure  of property rights, which is determined  primarily
by the state.  Secure property rights enhance stability and predictability;  they shape the "structural
frontier" of an economy  (Eggertsson 1990: 326-327). Yet again, empirical evidence is hard to come
by.  Even political stability  is no clear predictor of growth, although  Mackie (1987) argues that it may
be a necessary condition (p.  2P3).
'From a paper written by Adam Smith  in 1755, quoted in Edward Canan, "Editor's Introduction"
to Adam Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London:  Methuen,
1950), p. xxxv, and cited by Bates, 1989, p. 3
37Nevertheless,  predictability  counts. When property  rights are incomplete,  easily abrogated, or
unstable, economies suffer.  Acts of the predatory state alter investment  in profoundly costly ways,
affecting  choice of technology  and inputs, production processes,  and social discount rates.  The nature
of  investment, and sometimes its very presence or  absence, depend on  investors' reading of the
likelihood  of appropriation  through decree or through suddenly  adjusted "taxation".  Yet reforming a
political system also has Losts: the costs of change itself, and those of maintaining  new systems.
A basis exists for including human rights and their relationship  to economic  performance in
discussions  of the rule of law and the aevelopment  of stable  property rights that will support long term
growth with equity (Barzel 1989).  For example, legal discrimination  against women can lead to
distorted labor  markets and  lower  economic performance.  The  specification, protection, and
enforcement of  property rights  (including property rights over  one's  own person) is  a  task  for
governments. And yet Dunn (1985)  concludes  that, "The presence  or absence  of effectively  guaranteed
civil and political liberties  does not in itself  ensure the prevalence  of good or bad government"  (p. 169).
Economic performance is a matter not simply of growth, but of growth with equity.  This
discussion  of the development  impact  of oredictability  and the rule of law would be incomplete  without
a  warning on the problem of unequally distributed property rights (Lindblom 1977; North 1990).
Governments  play a significant  role in determining  both the structure of laws and their enforcement.
Depending  on the motivation  of government actors, the instituti3nal  base of property rights may be
politically  derived and dependent  on clientelist  or patrimonial  ties.  Thus, the rule of liw may operate
smoothly  and still suppress broad-based  growth.  As Perrow (1986) warns, in a related vein, "Beware
of efficiency  arguments  that do not ask: efficiency  for whom, and at what cost to others?" (p. 278).
38IV.  CONCLUSION
It has been difficult  in this review to draw a correlation  between  governance  and economic  performance
with any degree of precision.  In part, this is due to the dearth of research focused on the specific
variables under discussion in this  review:  accountability  (including participation and  institutional
pluralism); openness and transparency; and the rule of  law.  In keeping with the intellectual and
professional  interests  of many who work and practice in this area, research  tends to focus more on the
relationship  of regime type to growth, or stability to growth.  In addition, political questions by their
nature tend to promote value-based  assumptions, i.e., that institutional  pluralism, participation,  and the
rule of law are "good" in and of themselves,  leaving the scope of inquiry  focused on the means  to these
ends.  Organizations  such as the World Bank, mandated  to promote economic  development  as an end,
have bypassed  most of these issues in sponsored  research programs.
Nevertheless,  this review  does provide  some support for a positive  link  between  these  governance
variables and economic  performance. Some correlations  appear stronger than others.  Arbitrary law
enforcement and failure to uphwi  the constitution -- the law -- lead to unpredictability,  instability, and
a poor climate for growth.  Thus, well-specified  property rights and enforceable  contracts--the  rule of
law -- are clearly economic  development  issues  and should be recognized  as such, with the caution that
the content  of property rights, and their distribution,  critically  affect how broad-based  development  will
be.  The failure of accountability,  combined  with opaque  and highly  discretionary  regulatory  procedures,
can provide greater opportunities  for economic  corruption  and waste.  Suppression  of political openings
may ultimately affect stability, disrupting production and commerce, while the failure to encourage
grassroots participation at the micro-level shows up  in projects that are often comparatively  less
sustainable.
This review also points out that research attempting to  correlate economic performance to
governance variables must  necessarily use  a  relatively short time frame.  The  recent economic
performance  of Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea took place with very low levels of political openness,
39and their market economic  systems  seemed to work in the absence  of pluralistic  political systems.  In
the past few years, however, all three have made significant  transitions  toward more open, competitive,
and participatory  political systems, suggesting  that sustaining as opposed to establishing  market based
growth may require the development  of political representation.>2  With the renewed interest in open
political systems  as a corrollary to open economic  systems, we can expect a new generation  of research
on these variables.
This review provides  other important  lessons  for those interested  in the technical aspects  of better
governance. Improving  governance is a complex  and long-term  endeavor, but as Zafar Ahmed (1990)
argues, "One cannot make a tree grow faster by pulling it from outside; it has to grow from its roots"
(p. 1). It takes generations  and perhaps centuries  to build effective  bureaucracies;  the issue  is not simply
skills but volition --  and much of that volition comes from effective  social pressure on the state.  This
needs to be understood by donors who may wish to make "governance"  the temporary trend of the
1990s. As Callaghy (1989) argues, "In much of the current policy work on the development  of state
capacity in Third  World countries . . . there  is a strong voluntarist or architectonic  streak that argues
that state capacity can be 'built'  as part of  a policy imperative.  The historical record belies this
assumption" (p.  117).  The  question for  donors should be:  how  can the  process by which
accountability  and the rule of law become the norm in a society best be nurtured?
Institutional  economists  examine  the very long-term conditions  under which the institutions  that
underpin  both market and state actians are formed. They also can help explain why different policies,
such as those suggested  in structural reform  packages,  lead to such different and seemingly  unpredictable
results:  although outwardly  the new rules may seem the same in two countries, the institutions  that
underpin  economic  responses  - local enforcement,  behavioral  norms, organizational  forms and interests,
"See, for example,  TLAI-jen  Cheng, "Democratizing  the Quasi-Leninist  Regime in Taiwan," MVorId
Politi  41, no. 4, July 1989; and Guillermo  O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions  ftom
Authoritarian  Rule: Tenative Conclusions  about  Uncertain  Democracies  (Baltimore,  MD: Johns Hopkins
University  Press, 1988).
40and property rights -- all differ, and changes  in institutions,  particularly in informal institutions,  occur
very slowly.
Political  scientists  focus on the reiationship  between  state and society in understanding  why states
act the way they do.  Many conclude  that strengthening  the private sector, including  voluntary  agencies,
entrepreneurs  and private associations,  will over time prove more effective  than short-term reforms and
foreign aid in forcing  accountability  from governments. The development  management  literature  brings
together perspectives  from organizational  theory, from political science and economics, and from other
social sciences  to offer practical assistance  in building  a domestic consensus  for sustainable  reform, for
improving performance, for  constructing effective vehicles for  participation, and  for  instituting
mechanisms of  budgetary review, information circulation, and  other  practical ways to  enhance
accountability,  openness, and predictability.
This review provides the elements of a framework  ',or viewing relations between politics and
economics  over the long term.  It indicates  that models and plans will work differently  in each country,
depending  on its institutional  base.  More research needs to be done on country-specific  institutional
evolution  - in particular, on the structure and pattern of enforcement  of property rights - in order to
understand  more precisely the likely results of policy and price changes.
This review  also indicates  that effective  property  rights and accountability  will result from a long-
term dialogue between governments and their private sector, rather than between governments and
donors.  The historical discussion in particular  underlined the potential for danger in a preponderant
donor role.  In Europe, public accountability  developed through a state-society struggle over the
collection  of tax revenues  and their use.  In many of the world's least developed  countries  tax revenues
are disproportionately  low as a percentage  of GNP, even given low levels of per capita GNP.  Foreign
aid in many of these countries makes up a towering proportion  of national revenues.  This naturally
tends to shift much  of the dialogue  over accountability  to one between  states and donors. In that sense,
41the very process of assistance  can inadvertently  undercut  the historical process of rulers first becoming
accountable  to elites for the use of their tax revenues.
Donors need to be aware of such potential effects of large sums of external assistance.  They
must make concerted  efforts to foster internal  debate, dialogue, and negotiation  on decisions  to allocate
foreign assistance  -- efforts that push the new concern for "local ownership"  toward a deep commitment
to work together to develop  economic  policies, even if such a process is slow and involves  frustrations.
This should  encourage  the development  of accountability  as a matter primarily  between  governments  and
citizens, and not only one between governments  and donors.  For in the final analysis, the quality of
governance  is a reflection of the quality of the relations between a state and its society, and only over
time can societies  push their governments  to deliver the accountability,  openness  and predictability  that
sustainable  development  requires.
42REFERENCES
Ahmed, Zafar. 1990. "Introduction," Long-Term  Perspective  Study  of Sub-Saharan  Africa, Background
Papers, volume 3: Institutional  and Sociopolitical  Issues. Washington,  DC: World Bank.
Ake, Claude. 1990. "Sustaining  Development  on the Indigenous,"  Long-Term  Perspective  Study  of Sub-
Saharan  Africa, Background  Papers, volume 3: Institutional  and Sociopolitical  Issues. Washington,  DC:
World Bank.
Alam, M. S. 1990. "Some  Economic  Costs of Corruption  in LDCs," Journal of Development  Studies,
vol. 27, October.
Annis, Sheldon. 1990. "Towards  a Pro-Poor Information  Agenda  at the World  Bank. Development:  The
Journal of the Society  for International  Development,  no. 2.
Avery, William P. 1988. "Political  Legitimacy  and Crisis in Poland," Political  Science Ouarterly, vol.
103, no. 1.
Badie, Bertrand and Pierre Birnbaum. 1982. Sociologie  de l'Etat.  Paris: Grasset.
Barzel, Yoram. 1989. Economic  Analysis  of Property Rights. Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.
Bates, Robert.  1989. Beyond the  Miracle of  the  Market: The  Political Economy of  Agrarian
Development  in Kenya.  New York: Cambridge University  Press.
Baumol, William J. and Kyu Sik Lee. 1991.  "Contestable  Markets, Trade, and Development."  The
World Bank Research Observer Vol. 6, No. 1, January.
Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1989. L'Etat en Afrique: La Politique  du Ventre. Paris: Fayard.
Bhaduri,  A. and Rahman,  M. (eds.). 1982.  Studies  in Rural  Participation,  New  Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
Bratton, Michael. 1989. "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational  Life in Africa," World
Politics, April.
Brett, E. A. 1988. "Adjustment  and the State: The Problem  of Administrative  Reform." IDS Bulletin
vol. 19, no. 4, October.
Bryant, Coralie and Louise  G. White. 1982. Managing  Development  in the Third World. Boulder,  CO:
Westview  Press.
Bryant, Coralie and Louise G.  White.  1984.  Managing Rural Development with Small Farmer
Participation. West Hartford, CT:  Kumarian  Press.
Callaghy, Thomas M. 1990. "Lost Between  State and Market: The Politics of i-conomic  Adjustment  in
Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria," in Nelson, ed.  1990. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice. Princeton:
Princeton University  Press.
Caporaso,  James A., ed. 1989. The Elusive  State: International  and Comparative  Perspectives.  Newbury
Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Carter Center of Emory University.  1990. African  Governance  in the 1990s:  Objectives.  Resources.  and
Constraint, Working Papers from the Second Annual Seminar of the African Governance  Program.
43Cernea, Michael, ed. 1985. Putting People First.  New York: Oxford University  Press.
Cerny, Philip. 1990. The Changing  Architecture  of Politics: Structure. Agency and the Future of the
State. Newbury  Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Chabal, Patrick, ed.  1986. Political Domination  in Africa: Reflections  on the Limits of Power. New
York: Cambridge  University  Press.
Clmatterjee,  B. and Gokhale, S. D.  1974. Social Welfare:  Legend and Legacy. Bombay: Popular
Prakashan.
Corkery, Joan and Jean Bossuyt. 1990. "Governance  and Institutional Development  in Sub-Saharan
Africa," Seminar  Report, 29-30 March, European Centre for Development  Policy Management.
Cumings, Bruce. 1987. "Northeast  Asian Political Economy,"  in Deyo, Frederick C., ed. The Political
Lconomv  of the New Asian Industrialization.  Ithaca: Cornell University  Press.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University  Press.
Dawisha, Adeed. 1986. "Power, Participation, and Legitimacy in the Arab World," World Policy
Journal, Summer, vol. III, No. 3,
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1966. Democracy  in America. New York: Harper and Row.
Deyo, Fredrick C.  1987. The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism. Ithaca: Cornell
University  Press.
Diamond, L. 1988. "Nigeria" in Diamond, L. J. L. Linz and S. M. Lipset, Demogracy  in Develoning
Q_ountries,  vol. 2. Africa.  Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Diamond, L.  J. L.  Linz and S.  M. Lipset.  1990. Politics in Develoning Countries:  Comparing
Experiences  with Democracv. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy.  Boston: Little, Brown.
Dunn, John. 1986. "The Politics of Representation  and Good Government  in Post-Colonial  Africa," in
Chabal, ed.,  1986. Political Domination  in Africa: Reflections  on the Limits of Power. New York:
Cambridge  University  Press.
Eggertsson, Thrainn. 1990.  Economic Behavior and Institutions New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Ekeh, Peter. 1975. "Colonialism  aad the Two Publics  in Africa: A Theoretical  Statement,"  Comparativ
Studies in Society and History 17 (Fall 1975).
Esman, Milton  and Norman Uphoff. 1984. Local Organizations:  Intermediaries  in Rural  Development.
Ithaca: Cornell University  Press.
Feng, Yu-lan. 1948. History of Chinese  Philosophv.  New York: The Free Press.
Gandhi, Mohandas K.  1957. An Autobiography:  The Story of My Experiments  With Tru  (edition
authorized  by the Navajivan  Trust). Boston: Beacon  Press.
Greenberg, Edward S.  and  Thomas F.  Mayer,  eds.  1990. Changes in  the  State:  Causes an
nseauences. Newbury  Park, CA: Sage Publications,  Inc.
44Grindle, Merilee.  "The New Political Economy:  Positive  Econornics  and Negative Politics," paper
prepared  for  presentation at  a  conference on  The  New  Political Economy and  Developnie  it
Policymaking,  Lake Paipa, Colombia, July 12-15, 1989.
Grosenick, Leigh E.  1984. "Research  and Democratic  Governance."  Public Administration  Quarterly.
Haggard, Stephan  and Tun-jun  Cheng. 1987. "State and Foreign Capital in East Asian NICs," in Deyo,
Fredrick C.,  ed.,  1987. The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism. Ithaca: Corn,ll
University  Press.
Haggard, S.  1990.  "Authoritarianism  and Democracy: Political Institutions  and Economic  Growlth
Revisited," in  Pathways from the Peripherv:  The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing
Copties.  Ithaca: Cornell University  Press.
Haggard, Stephan. 1988. "The Politics of Industrialization  in the Republic oi Korea and Taiwan,' ill
Helen Hughes, ed. Achieving  Industrialization  in East Asia.  New York:  Cambridge  University  Press.
Howard, Rhoda E.  1985. "Legitimacy  and Class Rule in Commonwealth  Africa: Constituiionalismi  and
the Rule of Law," Third World Quarterly  7(2) April.
Huntington,  Samuel  P.  and  Joan  M.  Nelson.  1976.  No  Easy  Choice.  Political  Paliicipa  jiL
Developing  Countries. Cambridge: Harvard University  Press.
Huntington,  S. 1968. Political Order in Changing  Societies. New Haven: Yale University  Press.
Hyden, Goran. 1990b. "Creating an Enabling Environment,"  in Long-Term  Perspective  Study of Sub-
Saharan  Africa, Background  Papers, vc:ame 3: Institutional  and Sociopolitical  Issues. June. Washingtowi
D.C.: World Bank.
Hyden, Goran. 1983. "Governance  and Politics," in No Shortcuits  to Progress: African Develo,meit
Management  in Perspective.  Berkeley: University  of California  Press.
Hyden, Goran. 1990a. "The Changing  Context  of Institutional  Development  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,' in
Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan  Africa, Background  Papers, volume 3: Institutional  and
Sociopolitical  Issues. June.
Johnston, Chalmers. 1987. "Political  Institutions  and Economic  Performance," in Fredrick C. Deyo, ed.
The Political Economy  of the New Asian Industrialism.  Ithaca: Cornell University  Press.
Joseph, Richard. 1990. "Political Renewal in Sub-Saharan  Africa:  The Challenge  of the 1990s," in
African Governance in the 1990s, Working Papers from the 2nd Annual Seminar of the African
Governance  Program. Atlanta: The Carter Center.
Kohli, Atul. 1987. The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge
University  Press.
Korten, David. C.  1990.  Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agnda.
Hartford, CT: Kumarian  Press.
Lancaster, Carol.  1990. "Governance  in Africa: Should  Foreign Aid be Linked to Political Reforn,"
in Richard  Joseph, ed. African Governance  in the 1990s. Atlanta: The Carter Center.
Lasswell, Harold. 1958. Politics: Who Gets What. When. and How. New York: Meridian.
45Lindblom, C. E.  1977. Politics and Markets: The World's PolitiWal-Economic  Systems. New York:
Basic  Books, Inc.
Lindenberg, Marc and Benjamin  Crosby. 1981.  Managing  Development:  The Political Dimension.
West Hartford: Kumarian  Press, Library of Management  for Development.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. Political  Man. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Lonsdale, John.  1986. "Political Accountability  in African History," in Chabal, ed.  1986. Political
Domination  in Africa: Reflections  on the Limits of Power. New York: Cambridge  University  Press.
Mackie,  J. A. C. 1988.  "Economic  Growth in the ASEAN Region: The Political Underpinnings,"  in
Helen Hughes, ed. 1988. Achieving  Industrialization  in East Asia.  New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Midgley, James with Anthony Hall, Margaret Hardiman, and Dhanpaul Narine. 1986.  Community
Participation. Social Development  and the State.  London: Methuen  & Co. Ltd.
Migdal,  Joel S. 1988. Strong Societies  and Weak  States: State-Society  Relations  and State Capabilities
in the Third World. Princeton; Princeton  University  Press.
Morris, Cynthia Taft and Irma Adelman. 1989. "Nineteenth-Century  Development  Experience and
Lessons  for Today," in World Development  17, 9:1417-1432.
Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Twentieth
Century Fund.
Nelson, Joan,  ed.  1989.  Fragile Coalitions: The  Politics of  Economic Adjustment. Overseas
Development  Council  U.S.-Third World Policy Perspectives 12.  New Brunswick,  N.J.:  Transaction.
Nelson, Joan M. ed. 1990.  Economic  Crisis and Policv  Choice: The Politics  of Adjustment  in the Third
World. Princeton: Princeton University  Press.
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York:
Cambridge  University  Press.
Nyang'oro, Julius E.  1989. "The State of Politics in Africa: The Corporatist Factor,"  Studies in
Comparative  International  Development,  Spring, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 5-19.
O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. 1986.  Transitions  from Authoritarian  Rule: Tentative
Conclusions  About Uncertain  Democracies.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins  University  Press.
Okun, Arthur. M. 1975. Equality  and Efficiency:  The Big Tradeoff. Washington,  DC: The Brookings
Institution.
Olson, Mancur. 1981. The Rise and Decline of Nations:  Economic Growth. Siagflation  and Social
Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University  Press.
Organization  of African  Unity. 1981. African Charter on Human and People's Rights.  Addis Ababa.
Page, John M. Jr., and William  F. Steel, Small Enterprise  Development:  Economic  Issues from African
Experience,  World Bank Technical Paper 26. Washington,  D.C., 1984.
Paltiel, Jeremy T.  1989. "China: Mexicanization  or Market  Reform?" in Caparoso, James A. ed. 1989.
The Elusive State: International  and Comparative  Perspectives.  Newbury  Park, CA: Sage Publications,
Inc.
46Paul, S. 1990. "Accountability  in Public Services: Exit, Voice and Capture." Washington  DC: The
World Bank. August.
Perrow, Charles. 1986. Complex  Organizations:  A Critical Essay (third edition). New York: Random
House.
Polanyi, Karl.  1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic  Origins of Our Time.
New York: Rinehart.
Reynolds,  Lloyd G. 1983. "The Spread of Economic  Grcwth to the Third World." Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 21, September.
Rose, Richard, ed. 1980.  Challenge  to Governance:  Studies in Overloaded  Polities. London  and Beverly
Hills: Sage.
Rothchild, Donald and Naomi Chazan, eds. The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa.
Boulder, CO: Westview  Press.
Salmen, Lawrence. 1987. Listen to the People. New York:  Oxford University  Press.
Sandbrook, Richard. 1985. The Politics of Africa's  Economic Stagnation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University  Press.
Schumpeter,  Joseph. 1950. Capitalism. Socialism  and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Seidman,  R. 1984. "Drafting  for the Rule of Law: Maintaining  Legality  in Developing  Countries,"  Yale
Journal of International  Law, vol. 12.
Sen, Amartya. 1991. "Comments  in Roundtable  Discussion," Proceedings  of the World Bank Annual
Conference  on Development  Economics.  Washington:  The World Bank.
Sharma, S. ed. 1978. Dynamics  of Development  (2 vo!s). Delhi: Concept  Publishing Company.
Sklar, Richard. 1987. "Developmental  Democracy," Comparative  Studies in Society  and History, vol.
29, no. 4.
Sorenson,  George. 1990. Democracy.  Dictatorship  and Development. New York:  St. Martin's Press.
Strange, Susan. 1988.  States and Markets:  An International Political Economy. New York: Basil
Blackwell.
Theobald, Robin. 1990. Corruption. Development.  and Underdevelopment.  Durham: Duke University
Press.
United Nations. Division of  Human Rights. 1983. Human Rights: A Compilation of International
Instruments.  New York: United Nations.
Uphoff, Norman and Milton  Esman. 1984. Local Organizations:  Intermediaries  in Rural Development.
Ithaca: Cornell University  Press.
Vanhanen,  Tatu. The Process of Democratization:  A Comparative  Study  of 147 States, 1980-1988. New
York: Crane Russak.
Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing  the Market:  Economic  Theory and the Role of Goverr,ment  in East
Asian Industrialization.  Princeton: Princeton  University  Press.
47Weede, Erich. 1983. "The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross-
National Ana;.,sis." Kykloos  vol. 36, no. 1.
White, Louise G. 1987.  Creatin2 Opportunities  for Change: Approaches  to Managing  Development
Programs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
White, Louise  G. 1990. Imnlementing  Policy  Reforms in LDCs: A Surategv  for Designing  and Effecting
Change. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Wilsford, David. 1989. "Tactical Advantages  Versus AdminiFtratve  Heterogeneity:  The Strengths and
the Limits of the French State," in Caporaso, ed. The Elusive State.
World Bank. 1989. From Crisis to Sustainable  Growth: The Long-Term Perspective Study on Sub-
Saharan  Africa (The "LTPS"). Washington,  DC.
World Bank. 1985. Operations Evaluation Department.  Sustainability  of Projects: First Review of
Experience. Washington,  DC.
48Po!icv  Research  WgLLing-PapSLl!Q2
Contact
ZttA  for  pa;er
WPS800  The  Legal  Framework  for Private  Cheryl  W.  Gray  November  1991  CECSE
Sector  Development  in a Transitional Rebecca  J. Hanson  37188
Economy  : The  Case  of f'oland  Michael  A. Heller
Peter lanachokov
Youssef  Djehane
WPS801  Unraveling  the Mysteries  of China's  Arvind  Panagariya  NovefTber  1991  D. Ballantyne
Foreign  Trade  Regimie:  A View  from  37947
Jiangsu  Province
WPS802  Strengthening  the Bank's  Population Steven  W.  Sinding  November  1991  0. Nadora
Work  in  the  Nineties  31091
WPS803  Financial  Regulation:  Changing  the  Millard  Long  November  t991  W. Pitayatonakarr'
Rules  of  the Garme  Dimitri  Vittas  37666
WPS804  Global  Trends  in Raw  Materials  Boum-Jono  Choe  Nove?mber  'q91  S. I.ipscomb
Consumption  33,'18
WPS805  Privatizatiori  in the Soviet  Union:  Sergei  Shatalov  November  1991  CEG  SE
The  Beginnings  of a Transition  37188
WPS806  Measuring  Commercial  Bank  Dimitri  Vittas  November  1991  W. Pitayatonakarn
Efficiency:  Use and Misuse  of Bank  37666
Operating  Ra ios
WPS807  Moderate  Inflation  Rudiger  Dornbusch  November  1991  S. MOUssa
Stanley  Fischer  33"190
WPS808  The  New  Trade  Protection:  Price  Ann Harrison  November  1991  D. BaHlantyne
Effects  of Antidumping  and  37947
Countervailing  Measures  in the United
States
WPS809  Openness  and  Growth:  A Time  Ann Harrison  November  1991  WDR  Offico
Series,  Cross-Country  Analysis  for  31393
Developing  Countries
WPS810  Poverty  and Income  Distribution  Francois  Bourguignon  November  1991  D. Ballantyne
during Adjustment:  Issues  and  Jaime  de Melo  37947
Evidence  from the OECD  P oject  Christian  Morrisson
WPS811  Compa,ative  Resource  Allocations  Peter  T. Knigh!  December  1991  D  Afzal
to Human  Resource  Development  Sulaiman  S. Wasty  36335
WPS812  Alternative  Forms  of External  Stijn Claessens  December  1991  S. King Watson
Finance: A Survey  31047
WPS813  Price  Stabilization  for Raw  Jute  Takamasa  Akiyama  December  1991  D. Gustafson
in Bangladesh  Panos  Varangis  33714PoicIy  Research Working  Paer  Series
Contact
Tile  Author  bfor  papgr
WPS814  Finance,  Growth,  and Public  Policy  Mark  Gernler  December  1991  W. Pitayatonakarn
Andrew  Rose  37666
WPS815  Governance  and Economy:  A Review Deborah  Brautigam  December  1991  Z. Kranzer
37494